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Lara v. State, 120 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 20, 87 P.3d 528 (2004)1 
 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – POST-CONVICTION RELIEF – HABEAS 
CORPUS 
 
Summary 
 
 Appeal from a district court order denying a post-conviction petition for a write of habeas 
corpus.2 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 Affirmed.  A petition for habeas corpus relief is appropriately denied when defendant’s 
attorneys provided effective assistance at all stages of trial.   
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 On April 10, 1997, the State charged appellant Jerry Lara with use of a deadly weapon 
(open murder) and discharging a firearm into a vehicle, stemming from an October 26, 1996 
incident.  The State alleged that Lara fired several shots at the rear of Eduardo Sonera’s 1976 
Cadillac and that one of the bullets hit and killed Alex Arroyo, a child passenger.  At trial, the 
State theorized that eyewitnesses’ inconsistent statements were related to Lara’s alleged 
membership in the “18th Street Gang.”   
 
 A jury found Lara guilty on all charges.  Lara subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, 
which the district court denied.  Lara received a life sentence with the possibility of parole after a 
minimum 20 years on the murder conviction, an equal and consecutive sentence for the deadly 
weapon enhancement, and a concurrent 16 to 72 month sentence for discharge of a firearm.  Lara 
was also ordered to pay $3,843.55 in restitution and received credit for 353 days served in local 
custody.  The supreme court dismissed his direct appeal. 
 
 Lara then filed a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Lara claimed 
prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel.  The district court properly denied the prosecutorial misconduct claim for 
procedural reasons.3 
 
 Lara appealed the order, arguing that the district court erred in denying the ineffective 
counsel claims.  Lara claimed that trial counsel failed to object to evidence of, and examine 
witnesses concerning Lara’s alleged gang involvement; failed to object to or address evidence 
that witnesses gave inaccurate information for fear of retaliation; presenting gang evidence as 
part of the defense case; giving inadequate advice on whether Lara should testify; and failing to 
                                                 
1 By Hilary Barrett Muckleroy 
2 See NEV. REV. STAT. 34.575(1) (2004). 
3 This claim should have been raised on direct appeal.  See NEV. REV. STAT. 34.810(1)(b) (2004). 
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properly examine Lara.  Lara further claimed that appellate counsel failed to raise claims of error 
in connection with the admission of evidence of gang membership and fear of retaliation at trial. 
    
Discussion 
 
Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel 
  
 The question of whether a defendant has received ineffective counsel is a mixed question 
of both fact and law and is, therefore, subject to appellate review.4  The district court’s factual 
findings are entitled to deference upon review.5   
 
 Using the Strickland v. Washington6 factors, a defendant must establish two factors to 
prevail on a claim of ineffective counsel at trial.  First, the counsel must have provided deficient 
performance.  Second, the deficient performance must have prejudiced the defense.  To establish 
deficient performance, the defendant must show that the counsel’s performance fell below and 
objective standard of reasonableness.  To establish prejudice, the defendant must show a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different, but for the 
counsel’s errors.  Trial counsel’s strategy and tactics are “virtually unchallengeable absent 
extraordinary circumstances.”7 
 
 Lara first contended that his trial attorney was ineffective because he failed to object to 
gang-affiliation evidence, inadequately cross-examined State witnesses, and called a defense 
witness who revealed Lara was in a gang.   
 
 Gang affiliation evidence may be relevant and is not substantially outweighed by unfair 
prejudice when it proves motive.8  The State properly offered evidence of gang affiliation as a 
motive for the shooting and to explain the bias or fear of witnesses.  Defense counsel also had to 
reveal Lara’s gang affiliation to impeach State witnesses and support Lara’s alibi defense.  
During the post-conviction hearing, Lara’s trial counsel stated that he questioned the jury 
regarding gang-related issues because the jury would know of Lara’s gang affiliation due to his 
tattoos and the nature of the case.  Further, trial counsel testified that he had to reveal Lara’s 
gang affiliation to exploit inconsistencies and deficiencies in the State’s evidence. 
 
 The supreme court concluded that the gang-related evidence was probative as to motive.  
The court also concluded that it was reasonable for trial counsel to conclude that disclosure of 
Lara’s gang affiliation was critical to establish the alibi and impeach State witnesses.  Because 
trial counsel could not properly defend the case without addressing the gang issue, Lara did not 
establish that his counsel was ineffective at trial.  Therefore, Lara did not satisfy the first prong 
of the Strickland test.9 
                                                 
4 State v. Love, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138 (1993). 
5 Riley v. State, 110 Nev. 638, 647 (1994). 
6 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  See also Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 987 (1996). 
7 Doleman v. State, 112 Nev. 843, 848 (1996). 
8 Lay v. State, 110 Nev. 1189, 1195-96 (1994); see also NEV. REV. STAT. 48.045(2) (2004). 
9 The supreme court also held that Lara failed to satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test.  For that, it deferred  
to the finding of the district court The district court found “even if trial counsel made some strategic errors, [Lara]  
was not prejudiced because of compelling evidence of his guilt including his identification by four eyewitnesses,  
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 Further to Lara’s contention that his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel advised 
Lara to testify at trial, the supreme court concluded that counsel properly advised Lara of his 
right to testify or not testify.  An accused makes the fundamental decisions regarding the case, 
including the decision whether to testify.10   
 
 Lara also contended that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to 
the introduction of evidence that witnesses gave inconsistent statements out of fear of 
retaliation.11  Because trial counsel objected to some of this testimony, and later impeached 
witnesses on cross-examination, the failure to object did not constitute ineffective assistance.  
Trial counsel used tactical and strategic decisions during the examinations of witnesses.  
Therefore, neither Strickland factor was satisfied. 
 
Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
 
 Lara next argued that he received ineffective assistance from appellate counsel because 
counsel failed to argue prosecutorial misconduct and that the district court erred in not screening 
the gang-related evidence in a Petrocelli hearing.   
 
 The right the effective counsel extends to a direct appeal.12  The Strickland test is also 
used to review a claim of ineffective appellate counsel.  “To establish prejudice based on the 
deficient assistance of appellate counsel, the defendant must show that the omitted issue would 
have a reasonable probability of success on appeal.”13   
 
 Lara’s appellate counsel had prosecuted more than 100 criminal appeals, and after a full 
assessment of the case, chose to focus on the denial of Lara’s motion for a new trial.  Appellate 
counsel need not raise every non-frivolous issue to provide effective assistance.  Since the 
district court properly admitted the gang-related evidence, any appeal of those issues would have 
been fruitless.    
 
Conclusion 
 
 Counsel can differ as to the best strategical and tactical decisions in defending a criminal 
defendant without providing ineffective assistance. 
                                                                                                                                                             
two of whom were neutral to the parties involved in the incident.” 
10 Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). 
11 The State introduced this evidence based on Lay v. State, 110  Nev. 1189, 1193-94 (1994).  In that case, the  
Nevada Supreme Court held that fright or general concern for one’s safety could provide an explanation as to why  
the witness made inconsistent statements.  
12 Kirksey, 112 Nev. at 998. 
13 Id. 
